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"FOR IT'S ONE, TWO, THREE STRIKES,
YOU'RE OUT...,
KAYCEE HOPWOOD*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States is currently in the midst of a medical
malpractice' crisis.' Physicians nationwide claim that they are
being forced to desert their practices due to soaring medical
However, this malpractice
malpractice insurance premiums.4
. J.D. Candidate, May 2006, The John Marshall Law School. The author
would like to thank her family for their constant support. The author would
also like to give a special thanks to her husband, Greg Hopwood, for his
encouragement and unending patience throughout the last three years.
1. JACK NORWORTH, TAKE ME OUT TO THE BALL GAME (York Music Co.
1927), available at http://www.baseball-almanac.com/poetry/po-stmo.shtml
(last visited Oct. 6, 2004).
2. Black's Law Dictionary defines "malpractice" as
[flailure of one rendering professional services to exercise that degree of
skill and learning commonly applied under all the circumstances in the
community by the average prudent reputable member of the profession
with the result of injury, loss or damage to the recipient of those services
or to those entitled to rely upon them.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 959 (6th ed. 1990). See also NGA CENTER FOR BEST
PRACTICES, ADDRESSING THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE CRISIS 1
at
available
2002),
5
(Dec.
http://www.nga.org/cda/files/l102MEDMALPRACTICE.pdf (defining medical
malpractice) [hereinafter NGA BRIEF]. In order to avoid being forced to
personally compensate victims of medical malpractice, physicians protect
themselves by obtaining malpractice insurance. Franklin D. Cleckley &
Govind Hariharan, A Free Market Analysis of the Effects of Medical
Malpractice Damage Cap Statutes: Can We Afford to Live With Inefficient
Doctors?, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 11, 54 (1991) (explaining why physicians purchase
medical malpractice insurance as well as the probability that malpractice will
occur).
3. Valerie Witmer, A Patient Perspective: Focusing on Compensating
Harm, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 589, 590 (2004) (dispelling the myth that
uncontrollable litigation is to blame for the current medical malpractice
crisis).
4. Leo Boyle, The Truth About Medical Malpractice, TRIAL, Apr. 2002,
See
available at http://www.vanosteen.com/news/medical-malpractice.asp.
also Ken Thomas, Bush: 'We're Not Going to Let This Issue Lie' Governor Urges
Malpractice Awards Reform, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Apr. 1, 2003 (on file
with author) (discussing doctors' contentions that they may be compelled to
desert their practices due to high insurance costs). Specifically, physicians
argue that because of the soaring premiums, they are being forced to choose
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madness is not a novel concept to the United States since the
nation experienced similar crises first in the 1970s and again in
the 1980s.5
Physicians and critics of the current tort system specifically
blame their plights on excessive noneconomic damage awards,7
large contingency fees,8 and an abundance of frivolous lawsuits.9
However, out-of-control medical liability litigation is not the
cause. ° Instead, the crux of the crisis is the disturbing frequency
between relocation or premature retirement. Amanda Craig, A Physician's
Perspective on the Medical MalpracticeCrisis, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 623, 62425 (2004) (discussing physicians' alleged options when faced with soaring
insurance premiums). In addition, many physicians are threatening to quit
doing high-risk procedures, such as delivering babies. NGA Brief, supra note
2, at 1. However, physicians seem to ignore their exceptionally good fortune.
Jamie Court, Sued a Physician, Did You? The Doctor Won't See You Now;
Ethics collapse over malpractice insurance cost, L.A. TIMES, June 13, 2004. In
fact, a Medical Economics Magazine survey indicated that in 2002, even after
paying medical malpractice insurance and other deductible expenses,
OB/GYNs still averaged $220,000, whereas invasive cardiologists made in the
range of $360,000. Id.
5. Michael D. Maves, DisappearingDoctors: The Medical Liability Crisis,
American
Medical
Association,
http://www.medicine.osu.edu/alumni/disappearingdocs.ppt#1 (last visited Nov.
10, 2005). The first medical malpractice crisis has been described as a crisis of
availability. Id. Unlike in the 1970's, the second crisis in the 1980's has been
portrayed as an affordability crisis. Id. Although the 1990's did not see such a
dilemma, the third and most current crisis developed at the onset of the
twenty-first century. Id.
6. The tort system provides a primary vehicle to resolve incidents of
medical negligence. NGA Brief, supra note 2, at 4. Theoretically, the purpose
of the tort system is to compensate the injured and to prevent injuries from
occurring in the future. Id.
7. Richard W. Stevenson, President Asks Congress for Measures Against
Frivolous Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2003. President Bush argues that
without a $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages, "excessive jury awards will
continue to drive up insurance costs, will put good doctors out of business or
run them out of your community, and will hurt communities like Scranton,
Pa." Id.
8. MIMI MARCHEV, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE CRISIS:
OPPORTUNITY
FOR
STATE
ACTION
16
(2002),
available
at

http:/www.nashp.orgFiles/gn148_medicalmalpractice.pdf. (last visited Oct. 6,
2004). As a result, physicians in the state of Florida recently proposed an
amendment to the state's constitution which would cap the amount that
lawyers can earn from a medical malpractice lawsuit. Siobhan Morrissey,
Med-Mal War Hits the Ballot, 3 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 30 (2004).
9. Marc Levy, Malpractice Crisis May be More Complex Than Blaming
Lawyers, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, May 11, 2003, available at
http://www.phillyburbs.com/
pb-dyn/news/103-05122003-87311.html. See also PoliticsKeeps Real Remedies
for Medical Errors Off Radar, USA TODAY, Sept. 13, 2004, at 19A
[hereinafter Politics] (discussing President Bush's contention that "junk
lawsuits" are to blame for the current medical malpractice crisis).
10. Witmer, supra note 3, at 590. See also Medical Liability Issues:
Hearing Before the H. Energy and Commerce Comm.: S. Comm. On Health,
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with which medical malpractice occurs." As a result, caps on
noneconomic damages and contingency fees, and a reduction of
frivolous lawsuits are not the solution.
According to a 1999 study conducted by the Institute of
Medicine, as many as 98,000 people die annually due to medical
errors that could have been avoided.12 In fact, more people die
from medical malpractice each year than from automobile
accidents, AIDS, and breast cancer.13 Interestingly, the National
Practitioner Data Bank ("NPDB)" reports that only a minority of
physicians are responsible for a majority of malpractice awards. 5

108th Cong. (2003) [hereinafter Rosenfield] (statement of Harvey Rosenfield:
TLC Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights) (reasoning that the
current medical malpractice crisis is not due to malpractice litigation). But see
Craig, supra note 4, at 626-27 (arguing that the litigation system is behind the
recent crisis).
11. Boyle, supra note 4.
12. HEALTH GRADES QUALITY STUDY, PATIENT SAFETY IN AMERICAN

HOSPITALS
1
(2004),
available
at
http://www.healthgrades.com/media/english/pdf/HGPatientSafetyStudyFi
nal.pdf. Every six months, patient safety related incidents claim more lives in
America than the Vietnam War did. Id. If medical errors were considered to
be a "cause of death" by the CDC, these errors would rank number six. Id. at
2. Although the statistics regarding fatalities due to medical errors are
shocking, they do not take in to account the countless people whose lives are
shattered because of medical malpractice. Harvey F. Wachsman, Lawsuits
Protect Public, USA TODAY, Sept. 13, 2004, at 19A.
13. Maves, supra note 5.
14. Pursuant to the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986,
Congress created the NPDB. AMA-ASSN.com, National Practitioner Data
Bank, httpJ/www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/4543.html (last visited Aug.
31, 2004). Specifically, "[tihe National Practitioner Bank (NPDB) is an
electronic repository of all payments made on behalf of physicians in
connection with medical malpractice settlements or judgments as well as
adverse peer review actions against licenses, clinical privileges, and
professional society memberships of physicians and other health care
practitioners." Id. Federal law mandates that in addition to information on
specific adverse actions, all information regarding medical malpractice
payments is required to be conveyed to the NPDB. Id. Unfortunately, the
public does not have access to the information contained in the Data Bank.
Joseph T. Hallinan, Doctor Is Out: Attempt to Track Malpractice Cases Is
Often Thwarted, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 2004, at Al. As a result, if a physician
has paid a malpractice award or settlement, that physician's patients have no
way of knowing. Id. See also NGA Brief, supra note 2, at 10 (discussing the
functions of the National Practitioner Data Bank).
15. See Citizen.org, Stopping Repeat Offenders: The Key to Cutting Medical
Malpractice Costs, http://www.citizen.org/printarticle.cfm?ID=8308
(last
visited Sept. 12, 2004) (providing statistical information regarding the
percentage of physicians who are largely responsible for most of the medical
malpractice that occurs in the United States) [hereinafter Stopping Repeat
Offenders]. According to Public Citizen's Dr. Sidney Wolfe, "[a] relatively
small percentage of docs are causing injury and death to patients, and not
being disciplined for it." Scott Finn, State Ranks 2nd in Multiple-Payout
Doctors DatabaseMay Be Flawed, Cabell Senator Says, CHARLESTON GAZETTE
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As a result, the most logical solution to this recurrent crisis is to
drastically reduce the astronomical number of medical malpractice
incidents that occur each year, 16 a solution that can be achieved by
stopping the repeat offenders who are responsible for the bulk of
all medical liability litigation. 7
Part I of this Comment will chronicle the origins of
malpractice litigation and explain the role of state medical
It will also discuss the ramifications of
licensure boards.
inefficient physicians, and expose the detrimental consequences
that occur when repeat medical malpractice offenders are allowed
Part II will discuss and
to continue to practice medicine.
subsequently dispel the various solutions to the medical
malpractice crisis proposed by physicians and critics of the tort
system. Finally, Part III will offer a uniform, practical solution to
the so-called "med-mal" war.

II. BACKGROUND
A. The Origins
The first account of medical liability litigation dates back to
1375, where in Stratton v. Cavendish, a surgeon was held liable by
the King's Bench for negligently performing hand surgery. 8 The
first American case arose approximately four hundred years later
in Cross v. Guthery, where a plaintiff successfully brought an
action for damages against a surgeon who unskillfully amputated
his wife's breast, which ultimately caused her death. 9

(West Viriginia), Jan. 17, 2003, at 1C.
16. Rosenfield, supra note 10, at 32. See also Malpractice Reform Must
Focus on Reducing Patient Injury, Not Just Limiting Awards, Says the
Commonwealth Fund, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Jan. 5, 2004 (reasoning that in order
to resolve the current crisis, medical injury must be reduced) [hereinafter
MalpracticeReform Must Focus on Reducing PatientInjury].
17. See Paul Flemming, Health Care Rules Heading to Court, THE NEWSPRESS (Florida), May 13, 2004, at 3B (explaining the ramifications of a
proposed amendment to Florida's constitution which would target repeat
medical malpractice offenders).
18. Maves, supra note 5. To rationalize its decision, the King's Bench
compared the injured patient to a horse injured by a blacksmith, and reasoned
that in the latter instance, the blacksmith would be responsible for the horse's
injuries. Id.
19. Cross v. Guthery, 2 Root 90 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1794). See Maves, supra
note 5 (discussing that Cross was the first recorded American case). See also
John Fabian Witt, From Loss of Services to Loss of Support: The Wrongful
Death Statutes, the Origins of Modern Tort Law, and the Making of the
Nineteenth-Century Family, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 717, 732-33 (2000)
(discussing the first wrongful death actions allowed in the United States);
Douglas W. Taylor, Assessment and Plan for Medical Malpractice: Quality
Improvement Through Mediation, 6 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 343, 346
(2003) (discussing the United State's lengthy medical malpractice history).
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Nearly a century after Cross, Dent v. West Virginia gave the
states power to regulate who could practice medicine." In Dent, a
West Virginia statute provided the following three different
methods by which one could obtain a valid medical license: (1)
graduation from a "reputable medical college," (2) continuous
practice of medicine in the State of West Virginia for a ten-year
period prior to March 8, 1881, or (3) successful completion of the
state Board of Health examination.2'
The defendant was
ultimately precluded from practicing medicine when members of
the Board of Health concluded that the defendant did not receive
The Supreme
his diploma from a "reputable" medical school.'
Court of the United States affirmed the board's decision, reasoning
that "[t]he power of the State to provide for the general welfare of
its people authorizes it to prescribe all such regulations as, in its
judgment, will secure or tend to secure them against the
consequences of ignorance and incapacity as well as of deception
and fraud. " ' This holding delegated the power to regulate the
medical profession to the states,24 granting the states a great deal
of freedom to implement and enforce medical licensing laws .25
B. Delegationof Regulatory Duty
Although the Supreme Court in Dent granted states the
power to regulate the medical profession, the states uniformly
delegated their authority to state medical licensure boards." The
duties of these licensure boards include the investigation of claims
20. Phyllis Coleman & Ronald A. Shellow, Restricting Medical Licenses
Based on Illness Is Wrong-Reporting Makes It Worse, 9 J.L. & HEALTH 273,
278 (1994).
21. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 115-17 (1889). See also Thomas R.
McLean, Crossing the Quality Chasm: Autonomous Physician Extenders Will
Necessitate a Shift to EnterpriseLiability Coverage For Health Care Delivery,
12 HEALTH MATRIX 239, 245-46 (2002) (discussing the Dent decision); Edward
P. Richards, The Police Power and the Regulation of Medical Practice: A
Historical Review and Guide for Medical Licensing Board Regulation of
Physicians in ERISA-Qualified Managed Care Organizations, 8 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 201, 215 (1999) (discussing the three ways a person in West
Virginia could become licensed to practice medicine).
22. Dent, 129 U.S. at 118. See also Richards, supra note 21, at 216
(discussing the statute's requirement that an applicant receive his or her
diploma from a "reputable' medical college"); McLean supra note 21, at 246
(discussing the board's decision that the defendant did not obtain his diploma
"from a reputable medical school").
23. Dent, 129 U.S. at 122.
24. See McLean, supra note 21, at 245-46 (discussing the power of the
states to regulate medical licensure).
25. See Richards, supra note 21, at 218 (discussing the deference given to
states regarding medical licensure).
26. Coleman, supra note 20, at 278. These boards are usually comprised of
governor-appointed public and physician members. NGA Brief, supra note 2,
at 9.
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of unprofessional or incompetent conduct on the part of a
physician and disciplining a physician when such a claim is proved
to be true.27 Among their disciplinary powers are the rights to
implement and enforce probation, as well as to suspend or even
revoke a physician's medical license.28 Although state licensure
boards have broad powers under state law, these boards rarely
resort to disciplinary action.29 In fact, state medical boards only
took a mere 2,708 serious disciplinary actions in 2001. 30
In addition to their reluctance to discipline physicians, there
are numerous other reasons why state medical licensure boards
are not effective.31 For example, because states independently set
their own criteria that physicians must meet, state A may punish
conduct that state B deems acceptable."
Moreover, because
medical licensure boards only have jurisdiction in the state where
the board is located, disciplinary actions invoked by these boards
only have limited effects since a physician who has been
disciplined in one state can resume practicing in another state in
which he or she holds a valid medical license.2
"Physician
27. Timothy S. Jost et al., Consumers, Complaints, and Professional
Discipline: A Look at Medical Licensure Boards, 3 HEALTH MATRiX 309, 309
(1993) (discussing the jobs of state medical licensure boards).
28. Id. at 310.
29. Kathleen L. Blaner, Physician, Heal Thyself- Because the Cure, the
Health Care Quality Improvement Act, May Be Worse than the Disease, 37
CATH. U.L. REV. 1073, 1080 (1988) (discussing the roles that licensure boards
and peer review groups play in physician discipline).
30. Stopping Repeat Offenders, supra note 15.
31. See Robert S. Adler, Stalking the Rogue Physician:An Analysis of the
Health Care Quality Improvement Act, 28 AM. Bus. L.J. 683, 693-94 (1991)
(discussing the ineffectiveness of state medical licensure boards). Particularly
limited budgets restrict a great deal of boards, and as a result, a few contested
disciplinary actions can deplete all of their resources.
Id. at 694.
Furthermore, few state licensure boards gather medical malpractice data, and
even when it is accessible, this information is almost never used as a
foundation for disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 696. Last, board members find
it difficult to judge their colleagues, and this uneasiness is only heightened
when the physician subject to review is a friend. Id. at 693-94. See also NGA
Brief, supra note 2, at 9 (reasoning that medical boards are frequently
condemned for not investigating claims quickly enough, for being too lenient,
and for not adequately notifying the public about accused and disciplined
physicians).
32. Blaner, supra note 29, at 1079-80. The lack of federal involvement has
led to "complete state sovereignty." Id.
33. Id. at 1074. Despite disciplinary actions taken by state medical
licensure boards, so-called "rogue" physicians merely circumvent the system
by leaving the jurisdiction in which they were disciplined and resuming their
practice somewhere else. Adler, supra note 31, at 691. In fact, according to
the General Accounting Office, although a specific state medical licensure
board disciplined 122 practitioners in 1984, at least 49 of these physicians, or
over 40%, continued to practice medicine after merely moving to different
states. Id. at 691-92. Although it is suspected that an additional 43 of the
abovementioned 122 physicians may have also evaded the system by merely
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licensing boards ... are sometimes similar to the incompetent
physicians they try to discipline. From time to time they do a good
job, but they often are ineffective."34
1.

An Ohio Case Study

A study depicted in HEALTH MATRIX: JOURNAL OF LAWMEDICINE analyzed the way in which the Ohio State Medical
Board reacted to complaints closed by the board in 1990."5 Upon
receipt of the complaint, the Board ultimately registered it and
affixed each one to a routing form.36 Subsequently, the secretary
and the supervising member jointly determined how to deal with
the complaint." Interestingly, most cases did result in review or
investigation. 38 However, despite the fact that board staff or board
investigators did indeed evaluate most of the complaints sampled,
the Board dismissed a disturbing 75% of these complaints
immediately after this initial assessment. Shockingly, the Board
only took formal disciplinary action in a mere 2.5% of the
complaints investigated." Even more appalling is that 26% of
complainants never received any response to the complaints that
they filed.41 As the results of this study indicate, state licensure
boards are relatively ineffective at identifying and eliminating
incompetent physicians."
C. Inefficient Physicians
A substantial accumulation of data confirms that inefficient
physicians pose a significant threat; however, despite this
evidence, little has been done in the United States to address the
problem.' "Grave human tragedies invariably flow from allowing

moving to different states, the General Accounting Office was unable to
confirm their locations. Id. at 692. The devastation caused by these "rogue"
physicians has been documented in numerous highly publicized cases. Id.
34. Blaner, supra note 29, at 1111.
35. Jost et al., supra note 27, at 311, 326. This particular portion of the
study was derived from a random sample of 200 closed cases initially
generated by public complaints. Id. at 313.
36. Id. at 326.
37. Id. at 327.
38. Id. Specifically, ninety-two percent of the complaints sampled were
referred for investigation or for review. Id.
39. Id. at 330.
40. Id. See also Adler, supra note 31, at 692 (discussing the small and
unimpressive number of disciplinary actions actually taken by state medical
licensure boards against physicians).
41. Jost et al., supra note 27, at 333. In fact, only seven individualized
letters out of the original two hundred complaints studied were sent to
complainants in reply to their particular claims.
Id.
The majority of
complainants merely received standard form letters. Id.
42. Adler, supra note 31, at 692.
43. Id. at 690-91. In fact, a quick glance at the news most often reveals
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inefficient doctors to exist in the medical profession." 44 For
example, in May 2002, doctors diagnosed forty-six year-old Linda
McDougal with a very aggressive type of breast cancer and
recommended that she undergo a double mastectomy. 45 Luckily,
Linda's doctors later informed her that she in fact did not have
cancer, and that her diagnosis had been the result of a lab test
result mix-up." Unfortunately, Linda received this information
days after she underwent surgery for the removal of both of her
breasts.4 '7 The medical director at the hospital where this tragic
mistake occurred declined to reveal the identity of the pathologist
responsible for this mix-up; however, he did confirm that the
doctor continues to work at the hospital.'
When thirty-two year-old Stephanie Valdez decided to have
more children, this single mother of two underwent surgery to
have her prior tubal ligation reversed. 49 After the surgery,
Stephanie began to experience acute abdominal pain. Her surgeon
responded by removing a fallopian tube, as well as an ovary.'
Unfortunately, the surgeon failed to notice a roll of surgical gauze
in Stephanie's pelvic cavity that he left behind during the initial
surgery.5 As a result of this oversight, the gauze festered inside of
Stephanie's body for almost a year and caused a rampant infection
that5 nearly killed her before a twelve-hour surgery spared her
life."
These stories are only a few accounts of the nightmares that
occur as a result of doctors' incompetence. As a result, inefficient

numerous instances of situations involving incompetent doctors. Id. at 690.
44. Cleckley, supra note 2, at 62.
45. CBSNEWS.com, Mastectomy Mistake Fuels Debate, Jan. 21, 2003,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/01/18/health/main537085.shtml.
46. Id.
47. Id. Remembering the day that her doctor revealed to her what had
occurred, Linda recalled, "[sihe didn't know how to tell us other than to just

tell us, and immediately I thought I was dying, and she told me I didn't have
cancer." Id. As a further consequence of this lab test result mix-up, a woman
who actually had an aggressive type of breast cancer received Linda
McDougal's cancer-free results. Id. However, according to Dr. Daniel Foley,
the hospital's medical director, this woman has since been notified and
treated. Id.
48. Id. "If you're right 99.999 percent of the time, you don't want to be that
.01 percent because the consequences are serious and we have to be right 100
percent of the time," Dr. Foley commented. Id.
49. Christina Cheakalos et al., MedicalNightmares, PEOPLE, June 2, 2003.
50. Id. The surgeon who removed Stephanie's fallopian tube and ovary
blamed her abdominal discomfort on cysts. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. Ironically, the surgery that Stephanie underwent to allow her to
have more children subsequently left her infertile. Id.
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physicians who are unable to improve their performance should be
barred from practicing medicine.53
D Repeat Offenders
Although the number of people that die each year in the
United States as a result of medical malpractice is rightfully
alarming, surprisingly, the majority of all medical malpractice is
committed by a minority of physicians.54 In fact, since 1990, a
mere five percent of physicians are responsible for a shocking fiftyfour percent of medical malpractice settlements and awards. 55
Based on information obtained by Public Citizen from the
National Practitioner Data Bank, between the years 1988 and
1993, a New Jersey physician was involved in thirty-three medical
malpractice suits in which he either lost or settled,
while
between the years of 1990 and 1997, a Texas physician was
involved in thirteen malpractice actions which he also either lost
or settled. s Similarly, between the years of 1989 and 2001, a
Pennsylvania physician made twenty-four malpractice payments. 5
Since compelling evidence indicates that the majority of
medical malpractice is committed by a few "bad-apple doctors," it
only seems logical that the medical profession would prohibit these
repeat offenders from practicing medicine; however, that is not the
case. 5 Thus, although physicians claim that the United States is
currently in the midst of a crisis that is causing their medical
malpractice insurance premiums to soar, "[tihe true crisis is an
epidemic of medical malpractice." 0

III. ANALYSIS
A.

"Problem"Solutions

Physicians and opponents of the tort system who blame outof-control medical liability litigation for the present medical
malpractice
insurance
crisis
uniformly
propose
several
53. Blaner, supra note 29, at 1073.
54. Stopping Repeat Offenders, supra note 15.
55. Dr. William P. Gunnar, Is There an Acceptable Answer to Rising
Medical Malpractice Premiums?, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 465, 471-72 (2004)
(discussing that a small percentage of physicians are to blame for a large
percentage of malpractice awards).
Statistics show that only a small
percentage of doctors (4.8%) have made multiple malpractice payments to
injured patients. Stopping Repeat Offenders, supra note 15. In fact, only 1.7%
of physicians have made more than two payments, for a total sum of $11
billion. Id.
56 Stopping Repeat Offenders, supra note 15.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59. Boyle, supra note 4.
60. Wachsman, supra note 12.
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reoccurring, yet ineffective solutions to the dilemma, including
caps on noneconomic damage awards,"' caps on contingency fees, 2
and a reduction of frivolous lawsuits.'
1.

Caps on Noneconomic Damage Awards

Damages in medical malpractice cases generally fall into two
different categories:
economic damages for the actual monetary losses due to negligence
such as medical expenses, lost wages, rehabilitation costs or any
other economic out of pocket loss suffered as the result of a health
care injury; and non-economic damages for things such as pain and
suffering, disfigurement, and loss of companionship.64
The majority of the debates concerning caps center on
noneconomic rather than on economic damages,"' and there are
numerous explanations why capping noneconomic damages is not
the solution to the current medical malpractice crisis.'
Most
importantly, the three basic goals of tort law are essentially

61.
62.
63.
64.
for

Stevenson, supra note 7.
Marchev, supra note 8.
Levy, supra note 9.
NGA Brief, supra note 2, at 5; see also CBO.gov, Limiting Tort Liability
Medical
Malpractice,
Jan.
8,
2004,

http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=4968&sequence=O [hereinafter CBO]
(defining economic and noneconomic damages). See also Marchev, supra note 8
(differentiating between the two types of damages).
65. NGA Brief, supra note 2, at 5. Advocates of noneconomic damage caps
argue that these caps are the solution to the current medical malpractice
crisis; however, evidence suggests that health-care costs as a whole are
unlikely to be impacted by these caps. Kevin J. Gfell, The Constitutionaland
Economic Implications of a National Cap on Non-Economic Damages in
Medical MalpracticeActions, 37 IND. L. REV. 773, 781, 800 (2004) (discussing
the relatively small impact that a national damage cap would have on healthcare costs in general). Insurance costs associated with medical malpractice
only represent a very small portion of total health-care costs. Id. at 800. More
specifically, in 1992, the total cost of health-care in the United States
stretched over $800 billion, whereas only between five and six billion dollars
were paid by doctors in the form of premiums. Id.
66. See Witmer, supra note 3, at 595 (arguing that caps will deny patients
their right to be fully compensated for the their injury). However, proponents
of noneconomic damage caps maintain that these restrictions are necessary
since these damages have a tendency to be unpredictable. NGA Brief, supra
note 2, at 5. Advocates also argue that noneconomic damage awards are
extremely subjective, and difficult to quantify and calculate. Id. In spite of
the complaints regarding the unpredictability of noneconomic damage awards,
intangible losses, such as pain and suffering, are rightful components of
damages, and are essential to making the victim "whole" again. Witmer,
supra note 3, at 597. Damage caps "are an overly simplistic superficial way of
addressing these very serious problems that are taking place today in
America." Robert A. Clifford et al, Anatomy of a Malpractice Case From a
Litigator'sPerspective, 6 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 279, 292 (2003).
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negated by statutes that cap noneconomic damage awards.67 In
other words, these caps deny complete compensation to the
injured, fail to discipline wrongdoers, and promote possibly
dangerous behavior.6
First, caps on noneconomic damages deny victims of medical
malpractice full compensation for their injuries.' Even though a
specific 70objective of tort law is to make a winning plaintiff
"whole," patients who need an amount in excess of the capped
figure in order to be made "whole" again are ultimately denied
complete recovery.7 Thus, caps on noneconomic damages place
excessive and undue burdens on those victims who are the most
tragically injured.72 For example, when a jury awards a medical
malpractice victim noneconomic damages in the amount of
$1 million, and that figure is then drastically reduced to $250,000
as a result of a damage cap, that victim is not being fully
compensated.73
The unfairness that flows from caps on noneconomic damages
is a concept that is all too familiar to Gilford Tyler, who lost his leg
due to a medical error.74 In response to Tyler's tremendous loss
and for the pain and suffering that he would be forced to tolerate
because of his indefinite disfigurement, the jury awarded Tyler
noneconomic damages in the amount of $4.5 million; however, this
amount was drastically reduced to merely $515,000 in conformity
with the state's noneconomic damage cap." In response to the
significant reduction, the trial judge stated, "[t]he thought that the
injuries sustained by the Plaintiff are, in any way, compensated by
$515,000 is, facially abhorrent."7" It is evident from Tyler's story

67. Cleckley & Hariharan, supra note 2, at 49-50.
68. Id.
69. Witmer, supra note 3, at 595. See Phillip H. Corboy et al., Illinois
Courts: Vital Developers of Tort Law as Constitutional Vanguards, Statutory
Interpreters,and Common Law Adjudicators, 30 LOY. U. CH1. L.J. 183, 213
(1999) (reasoning that an Act which requires that noneconomic damages be
capped at $500,000 only hurt those individuals who needed more than the
amount provided for by the cap in order to be fully compensated).
70. See Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort:
Scheduling "Pain and Suffering", 83 NW. U.L. REV. 908, 909-10 (1989)
(discussing that returning the plaintiff to "whole" is one of tort law's primary
objectives); Gunnar, supra note 55, at 478.
71. Witmer, supra note 3, at 595.
72. Id. See Corboy et al., supra note 69, at 213 (reasoning that pursuant to
an Act which capped noneconomic damages at $500,000, "the more severely a
plaintiff was injured, the greater the disparity and distortion wrought by the
cap").
73. Witmer, supra note 3, at 598.
74. Gfell, supra note 65, at 775.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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that caps on noneconomic damages punish the most tragically
injured victims.7
Unfortunately, noneconomic damage caps also negatively
impact those who are "economically disadvantaged," as well as
children. 8 For example, economic damage awards guarantee
much more comfort and security to victims with yearly incomes of
over $300,000 than they do to victims who only earn minimum
wage or to children who are unable to predict their "future
potential earning capacity as a corporation president."79 As a
result, children who face indefinite pain and suffering and victims
who receive limited economic damage awards are the ones who
feel the devastating ramifications of caps on noneconomic
damages .80
Furthermore, capping noneconomic damages also negatively
affects women and the elderly.81 For example, take into account
the story of a housewife who developed brain damage as the result
of medical negligence.82 Her injury will require constant care and
assistance, yet as a housewife, she will receive no economic
damages in the form of lost wages.' Also consider the story of an
elderly woman who, due to a medical error, lost both legs.' Since
she is retired, the damages that she will receive in the form of lost
77. See Witmer supra note 3, at 595 (reasoning that caps on noneconomic
damages affect the most tragically hurt victims).
78. See Kathleen E. Payne, Linking Tort Reform to Fairness and Moral
Values, 1995 DET. C.L. MICH. ST. U.L. REV. 1207, 1228-29 (1995) (discussing
the classes of people who are the most significantly affected by caps on
noneconomic damages). Steven Oleson's story is a prime example of how caps
on noneconomic damages adversely affect children. Id. at 1228. A jury
awarded this severely handicapped child noneconomic damages in the amount
of $7 million; however, this award that was intended by the jury to
compensate Steven for things such as pain and suffering was drastically
reduced to $250,000 pursuant to a statutory cap on noneconomic damages. Id.
79. Id. at 1229.
80. Witmer, supra note 3, at 598.
81. Medical Malpractice: Caps on Non-Economic Loss Damages Would
Adversely Impact Women, Elderly, WOMEN'S HEALTH WEEKLY, Aug. 14, 2003
(discussing the adverse affects that noneconomic damage caps have on both
the elderly and on women). Unlike men, women experience gynecological
medical malpractice and various forms of reproductive harm. Id. The
emotional distress and other consequences that follow such injuries are not
compensated through economic damage awards. Id. Lucinda Finley, a tort
reform expert, said "[m] any of these more precious, indeed priceless, aspects of
human life are virtually worthless in the market, and they are compensated
through non-economic damages." Id. Finley further argued that since injured
retirees receive no economic damages in the form of lost wages, noneconomic
damage caps unfairly punish the elderly. Id. See also Witmer, supra note 3,
at 598 (reasoning that elderly patients and housewives feel the majority of the
effects stemming from caps on noneconomic damages).
82. Witmer, supra note 3, at 598.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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wages will be insignificant, as will her damages for future medical
expenses, since she will not need long-term care after the
surgery.85
Even though these victims did not experience
significant economic losses, their lives were drastically and
disastrously altered, and they will suffer continuously. 86 It is
indisputable that a noneconomic damage award capped at
$250,000 will in no way provide these victims with the complete
compensation that they rightfully deserve.8 7
In addition to denying victims of medical malpractice full
compensation, caps on noneconomic damages also fail to discipline
wrongdoers,' since these caps permit them to avoid paying
substantial amounts to their injured victims.89 Last, noneconomic
damage caps promote possibly dangerous behavior. 5 These caps
remove incentives for physicians to minimize error by eliminating
the risk of significant noneconomic damage awards.91 As a result,
physicians who engage in negligent conduct are permitted to
practice medicine, yet they are not subject to any significant
penalty.92
2.

Caps on Contingency Fees

Caps on contingency fees are not the answer to the current
medical malpractice crisis, since these caps make it difficult for
victims of medical malpractice, who have complicated, yet
legitimate claims, to retain an attorney.93 When contingency fees
are capped, the only victims who are able to obtain legal
representation are those with clear-cut cases and extremely
serious injuries."
Most plaintiffs' attorneys who take on medical malpractice
cases work on a contingency fee basis.95
Under this fee
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Cleckley, supra note 2, at 49-50.
Witmer, supra note 3, at 600.
Cleckley, supra note 2, at 49-50.
Witmer, supra note 3, at 595.

92. Id.
93. See CBO, supra note 64 (discussing the potential inefficiency that could
result as a consequence of capping contingent fees). See also Jennifer Heldt
Powell, Less Pain, Suffering for Docs; Calif Law reduces malpractice awards,
fees, BOSTON HERALD, July 13, 2004 (stating that critics argue that caps that
limit lawyer fees make it hard for victims with justified claims to obtain legal
counsel). Several efforts have been made by various states to limit lawyer
fees. NGA Brief, supra note 2, at 6. For example, some states have
implemented "sliding scales," whereas other states allow the court to fix
attorney fees at a "reasonable" sum. Id.
94. Rosenfield, supra note 10, at 20.
95. NGA Brief, supra note 2, at 6. Ironically, proposed reforms in no way
limit defense lawyers' hourly fees. Jean Hellwege et al., Slay the Beast of
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arrangement, not only is the client not required to pay the
attorney upfront, but the attorney only receives payment from the
client if the case ends in some form of an economic award.' As a
result, a plaintiff whose attorney works on a contingency fee basis
does not experience any monetary loss, despite the outcome of the
97
case.
When a suit ultimately produces a jury award or ends in a
settlement, an attorney working on contingency usually receives
one third of that award;98 however, it can cost an attorney
anywhere from $35,000 to $50,000 to bring an injured victim's suit
to trial.9 Contrary to physicians' beliefs that the prospect of large
jury awards encourages plaintiffs' attorneys to represent fruitless
claims, in reality, an attorney working on a contingency fee basis
is compelled to choose only those cases that are legitimate and are
likely to compensate the plaintiff.00 More specifically, since a
plaintiffs attorney only receives compensation for his hard work
when the case ends in a settlement or a jury award in favor of his
client, the contingency fee arrangement actually deters attorneys
from bringing frivolous claims."'
Last and perhaps most importantly, contingency fees provide
those who have limited resources with a place to seek redress for
their injuries, 02 thus allowing anyone who is injured, despite their
In his testimony before the
economic status, to bring an action.'
House Energy and Commerce Committee in 2003, Harvey
Rosenfield stated, "[a] contingency fee system is a poor patient's
only hope of affording an attorney to challenge a negligent
physician. Undermining such a system through caps on fees that
'Reform' Rhetoric, TRIAL, July 2004, at 24, 29 (discussing facts surrounding
contingency fees).
96. NGA Brief, supra note 2, at 6.
97. Gunnar, supra note 55, at 479.
98. Id. See also NGA Brief, supra note 2, at 6 (stating that a lawyer who
works on a contingency fee basis receives a percentage of the plaintiffs
award). In fact, professional rules require that lawyers only charge fees that
are reasonable. Hellwege, supra note 95, at 29. Usually, when a case ends
early, or when a case only requires that a lawyer do a small amount of work,
the lawyer will not charge the entire fee. Id. A typical proposal would cap
attorney contingency fees at a mere ten percent. Id. An attorney working on
this basis would be forced out of business if he or she took cases that did not
promise a large damage award. Id.
99. Gunnar, supra note 55, at 479.

100. Id. Actually, both the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility support contingency fees. Id.
101. Id. In fact, plaintiffs' attorneys assume all litigation costs, fully aware
that settlements or jury awards in favor of plaintiffs only occur in twentyeight percent of all malpractice actions. Id. Furthermore, the contingency fee
system also makes it less likely that litigation will be prolonged by attorneys,
since they must absorb pre-trial expenses. Hellwege, supra note 95, at 29.
102. NGA Brief, supra note 2, at 6.
103. Marchev, supra note 8, at 10.

20061

For Its One, Two, Three Strikes, You're Out...

reduce incentives for attorneys to take malpractice cases, gives
a license to be negligent in poor
dangerous doctors ...
neighborhoods.""'
3. A Reduction of Frivolous Lawsuits
A frivolous lawsuit is characterized as one "presenting no
debatable question to the court." 105 In response to the medical
malpractice crisis, President George W. Bush recently reasoned
that "[t]here are too many lawsuits filed against doctors and
hospitals without merit. And one thing the American people must
understand is even though the lawsuits are junk lawsuits, and
they have no basis, they're still expensive. " "
Interestingly, there is no statistical support for the contention
that the amount of frivolous lawsuits is increasing. 0 7 In fact, a
Harvard study indicated that out of every eight people who are
victims of medical malpractice, only one ever brings an action."0
Furthermore, plaintiffs' attorneys who most often work based on
contingency fee arrangements have no motivation for pursuing
baseless claims." Dr. Harvey F. Wachsman, a New York attorney
and neurosurgeon, best summed up the debate surrounding
frivolous lawsuits when he stated, "[t]hose who attack lawyers and
demand radical changes to the legal system are blaming the
messengers and trying to punish the victims. Lawsuits are the
only protection the public has against negligent physicians."'
In conclusion, "[t]he malpractice crisis is not about lawyers
and lawsuits. It is about the tremendous amount of malpractice
being committed.""' Therefore, caps on noneconomic damages and
contingency fees and a reduction of frivolous lawsuits are not the
solution to the dilemma.

104. Rosenfield, supra note 10, at 21.
105. Association of Trial Lawyers of America, 'Frivolous'Lawsuits Resource
Center,
http://www.atla.org/ConsumerMediaResources/Tier3/press-roomFACTS/frivol
ous/frivolous.aspx (last visited Sept. 16, 2004) [hereinafter Frivolous
Lawsuits].
106. Kathy A. Gambrell, Bush Seeks Medical Malpractice Reform, UNITED
PRESS INT'L (Washington D.C.), Jan. 16, 2003. See also Kenneth E. Thorpe,
The Medical Malpractice 'Crisis- Recent Trends and the Impact of State Tort
Reforms, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Jan. 21., 2004, at 6 (reasoning that very few
victims of medical malpractice actually file claims).
107. Frivolous Lawsuits, supra note 105. In fact, research indicates that
infamous accounts of frivolous lawsuits are actually extremely embellished or
even bogus. Id.
108. Gfell, supra note 65, at 779.
109. Frivolous Lawsuits, supra note 105.
110. Wachsman, supra note 12.
111. Id.
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B. MICRA and the HEALTH Act
In 1975, California passed the Medical Injury Compensation
Reform Act (MICRA) in an effort to satisfy striking doctors." 2 Two
of the key provisions in MICRA (1) "[p]lace a $250,000 cap on the
amount of compensation paid to malpractice victims for their 'noneconomic' injuries""' and (2) "[e]stablish a sliding scale for
attorneys fees which discourages lawyers from accepting serious or
complicated malpractice cases.""'
However, after the Act's
passage in 1975, premiums only escalated, and twelve years later,
medical malpractice premiums were 190% higher than they were
prior to MICRA."15
In the spring of 2003, the U.S. House of Representatives
passed the Help, Efficient, Accessible, Low Cost, Timely Health7
Care (HEALTH) Act,"' which was fashioned after MICRA."
Similar to the

California statute, the HEALTH Act limits

112. Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights, How Insurance Reform
Lowered Doctors' Medical Malpractice Rates in California: And How
Malpractice Caps Failed,Mar. 7, 2003 at 2 [hereinafter How Malpractice Caps
Failed].
113. Rosenfield, supra note 10, at 25. Interestingly, the cap's existence is
not revealed to juries, and without their knowledge, jury verdicts are
decreased. How Malpractice Caps Failed,supra note 112, at 2.
114. Rosenfield, supra note 10, at 25.
115. Id. at 3. In 1988, Proposition 103 was passed by Californians in
reaction to soaring insurance rates. How MalpracticeCaps Failed,supra note
112, at 2. The legislation "rolled back insurance rates for most policyholders,
including doctors, froze premiums and refunded millions of dollars to doctors
to compensate for excessive past premiums." Id. at 2. Proposition 103, not
MICRA, is credited with lowering insurance premiums in California.
Rosenfield, supra note 10, at 6. Seventeen years after he signed MICRA,
Jerry Brown, the former governor of California, admitted that he would not
advocate a national form of the MICRA legislation because he "witnessed yet
another insurance crisis and found that insurance company avarice, not
utilization of the legal system by injured consumers was responsible for
excessive premiums." ConsumerWatchDog.com, Five Dangerous Myths About
California's
Medical
Malpractice
Restrictions,
http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/malpractice/fs/?postld=993&pageTitle=
Five+Dangerous+Myths+About+California%27s+Medical+Malpractice+Restri
ctions [hereinafter Five Dangerous Myths] (last visited Oct. 6, 2004). See
FTCR Says Bush Should Blame Insurers Not Medical Malpractice Victims,
Says Reform is Answer to Malpractice Crisis, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Jan. 15, 2003
(reasoning that Proposition 103 lowered malpractice premiums in California).
116. Bob Gatty, Insurers' Losses Are 'Greatest Contributor'to Rising Rates,
DERMATOLOGY

TIMES,

Nov.

1,

2003,

available

at

http://www.dermatologytimes.com/dermatologytimes/article/articleDetail.jsp?i
d=76865. See Sharon Worcester, Medical Groups Call for Senate Passage of
Liability Reform, CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY NEWS, Feb. 1, 2004 (discussing
several of the components of the HEALTH Act). See also Tort Reform Bill Dies
in Senate, CONTEMPORARY OB/GYN, Aug. 1, 2003 (discussing Democrats'
negative perception of the HEALTH Act, as well as two reasons why some say
the bill did not pass).
117. Craig, supra note 4, at 630.
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noneconomic damages to $250,000 and limits attorney contingency
fees.'18 As expected, both the American Medical Association (AMA)
and President Bush are strong advocates of the legislation."9
Fortunately, the Act has not yet been passed by the Senate,120
since MICRA, the original model, proved not to be the solution to
California's malpractice dilemma."'
IV. PROPOSAL
The current malpractice dilemma calls for a nationwide
Fortunately, this objective can be achieved by
remedy. 2 1
implementing a law at the federal level that would prohibit repeat
medical malpractice offenders from practicing medicine anywhere
in the United States. 23 This proposal will concentrate on a recent
amendment to the state of Florida's Constitution termed "Public
Protection from Repeat Medical Malpractice" 124 and will advocate
that similar legislation should be fashioned after the Florida
amendment and subsequently implemented at the federal level.
A.

The PatternExists, Yet It Is Ignored

Medical malpractice litigation has been likened to "a giant
'lottery,' in which lawsuits are purely random events bearing no

118. Id. at 630-31.
119. Id. at 632.
120. Bob Gatty, Impact of Patient Lawsuit Limits Ruling Far Reaching:
Patients' Bill of Rights, Federal Malpractice Insurance Legislation in the
Senate May Be Influenced, DERMATOLOGY TIMES, Aug. 1, 2004. See Mary
Ellen Schneider, Physicians Push for Liability Caps, CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY
NEWS, Aug. 1, 2004 (reasoning that even though the United States House of
Representatives passed legislation that would impose noneconomic damages
caps, the legislation has not yet passed in the Senate).
121. See Craig, supra note 4, at 632 (stating that critics of MICRA argue
that it has not been effective in combating the malpractice crisis and the
prevention of justice).
122. Maves, supra note 5. Simplistic reasoning that does not have long-term
effects is not the solution to the current dilemma. See Monique Anawis,
Presentation: Tort Reform, 6 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 309, 309 (2003)
(reasoning that a solution with short-sighted reasoning will not remedy the
medical malpractice dilemma). Furthermore, medical malpractice reform
cannot be undertaken single-handedly by any county or state association.
Maves, supra note 5.
123. See Jim Saunders, Amendments Get Voter Support, DAYTONA BEACH
at
http://www.newsavailable
3,
2004,
NEWS,
Nov.
journalonline.com/NewsJournalOnline/News/Headlines/03NewsHEAD031103
04.htm (discussing the amendment to Florida's Constitution which would
preclude a doctor who has committed medical malpractice on three or more
occasions from practicing medicine in that state).
124. Floridians for Patient Protection, Amendment 8: Public Protection From
Malpractice,
Medical
Repeated
http://www.local6.com/politics/3848419/detail.html [hereinafter Amendment 8]
(last visited Nov. 7, 2005).
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relationship to the care given by a physician."'
However, as
previously mentioned, a majority of all malpractice awards are
generated by only a minority of physicians."'
In fact, this
distribution is not random at all, rather, it is extremely similar to
"drunk driving recidivism."" 7 Motor vehicle bureaus recognize
drunk driving patterns, and in anticipation, they suspend and
revoke drivers licenses in order to discourage and prevent those
individuals who are inclined to drive drunk from doing so." 8
Ironically, state medical boards do not utilize their power to
regulate the medical profession with similar force."
B. Florida'sResponse
In 2003, relying on suggestions that a minority of physicians
were to blame for a massive amount of malpractice, Floridians
began to question the state system's ability to discipline repeat
medical malpractice offenders."' In fact, research conducted by
Public Citizen established that about half of the medical
malpractice in Florida is committed by approximately six percent
of physicians,"' data that is strikingly similar to national statistics
on the subject. 3' In what has been called "a clash of the titans, "
attorneys and physicians took their malpractice differences to the
Florida ballot."
The end result was several amendments that
were proposed to the state's constitution,"' one of which
(Amendment 8) recently gave Florida voters the opportunity to
125. Stopping Repeat Offenders, supra note 15.
126. Id.
127. Id.

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Efforts to Curb Medical Errors Faltering; Consumers Remain
Frustratedat the Lack of Notice Given Towards PhysicianDisciplinaryIssues,
SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, Apr. 6, 2003 [hereinafter Efforts to Curb Medical
ErrorsFaltering].
131. Keep Malpractice Fight Out of State Constitution, PALM BEACH POST,
Oct. 7, 2004, at 18A [hereinafter Out of State Constitution]. The general
consensus is that most malpractice is committed by only a few physicians,
even if the precise percentage is disputed. Id.
132. See Gunnar, supra note 55, at 471-72 (reasoning that merely five
percent of physicians are responsible for roughly fifty-four percent of awards

and settlements resulting from malpractice lawsuits).
133. Morrissey, supra note 8.
134. Voters Approve All Three Medical Malpractice Issues, ASSOCIATED
PRESS
NEWSWIRES,
Nov.
3,
2004,
available
at
http://staugustine.com/stories/110304/sta_2681578.shtml [hereinafter Voters
Approve All Three].
135. Andi Atwater & Associated Press, Malpractice Changes Already in the
Courts: Lee Memorial Says It Won't Comply Yet, NEWS-PREsS, Nov. 4, 2004,
available
at
http://www.news-

press.com/apps/pbcs.dllarticle?AID=/20041104/NEWSO1/411040440/
1075/NEWS0107 [hereinafter Atwater].
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prohibit physicians who continually commit medical malpractice
from practicing medicine in the state. 3 '
Proponents of
Amendment 8 call it the "'three-strikes-and-you're-out' solution to
the problem of bad doctors."'37
The Ballot Summary for Amendment 8, Public Protection
from Repeated Medical Malpractice, stated: "Current law allows
medical doctors who have committed repeated malpractice to be
licensed to practice medicine in Florida.
This amendment
prohibits medical doctors who have been found to have committed
three or more incidents of medical malpractice from being licensed
to practice medicine in Florida.""
On November 2, 2004,
Amendment 8 was passed.139 An amazing 1,922,568 Floridians,
or
14
seventy percent of voters, supported the Amendment.
C. Follow the Leader
In order to resolve the existing medical malpractice dilemma,
it is essential to drastically reduce the astronomical number of
medical malpractice incidents that occur each year."" Patients
deserve increased protection, 4 2 and a national law modeled after
Florida's Amendment 8 will provide this protection by keeping
incompetent physicians from harming innocent patients."
Specifically, Amendment 8 provides that "'[nlo person who has

136. Sarah Skidmore, Amendment 8 Lets Voters Set Punished Doctors' Fate,
FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, Oct. 30, 2004,

at B-2.

137. Out of State Constitution,supra note 131.
138. Amendment 8, supra note 124.
139. See Bob Lamendola, Medical Malpractice Debate Rages on PostElection,
HERALD
TODAY,
Nov.
5,
2004,
http://www.bradenton.com/mld/bradenton/news/local/10103548.htm
(last
visited May 1, 2003) (stating that by a ration of 4-1, Amendment 8, Public
Protection from Repeated Malpractice, was passed by Florida voters).
140. Associated Press, Florida Voters Decide on Three Medical Malpractice
Issues,
Nov.
2,
2004,
available
at
http://
httpJ/www.redwoodsgroup.com/dental-quicknews-detail.asp?fniame=Floridav
otersdecideonthreemedicalmalpracticeissues (last visited Nov. 3, 2004). In
fact, only 819,284 Florida voters actually opposed the amendment and voted
against it. Id.
141. MalpracticeReform Must Focus on Reducing Patient Injury, supra note
16.
142. Ray Weiss, Hospital Backs Challenges to Amendments 7 and 8,
DAYTONA
BEACH
NEWS,
available
at
http://www.newsjournalonline.com/NewsJournalOnlineNews/WestVolusia/03WVolWEST02EF
POLFL10404.htm (last updated Nov. 4, 2004).
143. See
Wesh.com,
Learn
About
8
Proposed
Amendments,
http://www.wesh.com/print/3880019/detail.html?use=print (last updated Nov.
1, 2004) [hereinafter Proposed Amendments] (stating that proponents of the
amendment maintain that it will shield patients from the harm caused by
physicians who are incompetent); see also Skidmore, supra note 136
(discussing advocates' arguments that the number of incompetent physicians
in Florida will be limited by the amendment).
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been found to have committed three or more incidents of medical
malpractice shall be licensed or continue to be licensed by the
State of Florida to provide health care services as a medical
doctor."""4
In order to overcome the problems that medical
licensure boards encounter because of their limited jurisdiction,'45
the proposed federal legislation should implement an even stricter
limitation, and prohibit a physician who is found guilty of medical
malpractice on three or more occasions from practicing in any
state in America.
1.

Clarification

Adopting federal legislation similar to Florida's Amendment 8
would not affect physicians who merely have multiple claims filed
against them,'46 since the language of the amendment specifically
requires that the physician be "found to have committed" medical
malpractice on three or more occasions.' 7 In an effort to clarify
the exact meaning intended by the phrases "medical malpractice"
and "found to have committed," the drafters of the Florida
amendment included the following subsections:
i) The phrase "medical malpractice" means both the failure to
practice medicine in Florida with that level of care, skill, and
treatment recognized in general law related to health care
providers' licensure, and any similar wrongful act, neglect, or
default in other states or countries which, if committed in Florida,
would have been considered medical malpractice.
ii) The phrase "found to have committed" means that the
malpractice has been found in a final judgment of a court or law,
final administrative agency decision, or decision of binding
arbitration.141
Like the Florida amendment, the proposed federal legislation
should similarly require that physicians be "found to have
committed" multiple instances of medical malpractice and should
also include explanatory and clarifying language comparable to
that contained in Amendment 8.'4

144. Amendment 8, supra note 124.
145. Blaner, supra note 29, at 1074.
146. See David Fuller, Letters to the Editor, TAMPA TRIBUNE, Nov. 1, 2004
(reasoning that a claim is different from an adverse judgment by a jury).
147. Amendment 8, supra note 124. See Flemming, supra note 17 (reasoning
that a physician can only receive a strike from "a final court judgment, a final

administrative agency decision or the result of binding arbitration").
148. Amendment 8, supra note 124.
149. See id. (defining the terms "medical malpractice" and "found to have

committed").
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2. High-Risk Areas
It is contended that due to the inherent risks involved in
certain procedures, obstetricians, neurosurgeons, and a minority
of other specialists are more inclined to be sued. 5 ' It is further
argued that as a result of Amendment 8, these physicians will be
reluctant to take complex and high-risk cases.' 5' In response to
these well-founded apprehensions, it is necessary that the
proposed federal legislation set a separate and slightly higher
threshold for those physicians practicing in enumerated high-risk
areas; however, the decision as to which specialties qualify and the
specific number of "strikes" allotted these few areas are decisions
best determined by the legislature. It must be noted, however,
that these
52 specific specialties should not be entirely exempt from
the law."
3. Bad PhysiciansPunish Good Physicians
Typically, a physician's past malpractice litigation history
does not affect his or her insurance premium rates;" thus, repeat
malpractice offenders do not experience adequate rises in their
insurance rates proportionate to their malpractice litigation
records."
Alternatively, the threat created by these repeat
offenders is distributed among physicians in like areas."' Thus, a
federal law that prohibits repeat medical malpractice offenders
from practicing medicine would lower premium rates, since good
to pay for other physicians
physicians would no longer be forced
6
who are repeatedly incompetent."
V.

CONCLUSION

Out-of-control medical liability litigation is not to blame for
the current medical malpractice crisis,"' and caps on noneconomic
damages and contingency fees, as well as a reduction in frivolous
150. Skidmore, supra note 136. For example, every two and a half years,
physicians who specialize in high-risk areas such as neurosurgery or
obstetrics receive one claim against them. Maves, supra note 5.
151. Three-StrikesAmendment Would Wreck Medical Care, TAMPA TRIBUNE,
Nov.4, 2004.
152. But see Fuller, supra note 146 (arguing that Amendment 8's provisions

should not apply to certain physicians).
153. Adler, supra note 31,
(reasoning that a physician's
influenced by that particular
overall settlement payments,

at 695; see Gunnar, supra note 55, at 471
malpractice premium rates are typically not
physician's past malpractice litigation record,
or any disciplinary action taken against the

physician).
154. Gunnar, supra note 55, at 472.
155. Id.
156. See Boyle, supra note 4 ( "[Glood doctors - and far too many innocent
patients who are injured or killed - pay for bad doctors").
157. Witmer, supra note 3, at 590.
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lawsuits, are not the solutions to the dilemma." Instead, the key
to reducing medical liability litigation is to drastically lower the
number of malpractice incidents that occur each year,"' a solution
that can be achieved by implementing a national and slightly
modified version of Florida's Amendment 8.

158. Gfell, supra note 65, at 780. "The reforms advanced by tort reform
proponents, purportedly in the public interest, are actually in the interests of
the thousands of physicians who will be allowed to practice bad medicine,
undetected, undeterred, and untroubled by their conscience." Dr. Harvey F.
Wachsman, Individual Responsibility and Accountability: American
Watchwords for Excellence in Healthcare, 10 ST. JOHN'S J. L. COMMENT. 303,
324 (1995). Dr. Wachsman further argues that Americans "need reforms that
protect the public, not reforms that blame the injured, the disabled, and
victims of medical ineptitude and neglect." Id.
159. Rosenfield, supra note 10, at 23.

